

Agenda

- [Intro](#)
- [What are Supply Chain Attacks](#)
- [State of the Tooling](#)
- [Reproducible Builds](#)
- [Conclusion](#)

Secure Supply Chains



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$ whoami
```

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CAPTAINS



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What are Supply Chain Attacks

Supply Chain Attacks in the News

- Dependency Confusion Attacks
- SolarWinds

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- White House Executive Order

Supply Chain Attacks in the News


- Dependency Confusion Attacks
- SolarWinds
- White House Executive Order
- Nothing new: Ken Thompson's 1984: Reflections on Trusting Trust

Attackers Have a Variety of Methods

- Physical compromise
- Phishing and social engineering
- Unpatched applications
- Zero days
- Malicious insider
- Supply chain attacks

Supply Chain Attack

- Colonial Pipeline
- Find a soft upstream target before production
- Build servers and dependencies



xkcd.com/2347

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Securing the Supply Chain

- Validate inputs
- Harden build infrastructure
- Verify the process
- Signing result
- Distribution
- Admission control

State of the Tooling

SBoMs

- Software Bill of Materials
- Two standards:
 - [SPDX](#): Linux Foundation, focused on licensing
 - [CycloneDX](#): OWASP, focused on security
- Should cover artifact built, dependencies, build infra, runtime infra
- Some tooling to generate, working on distributing and ingesting
- This whole space is under very active development

Attestation

- Verifying truth and authenticity
- [in-toto](#): verify each build step was performed, development
- [Spiffe/Spire](#): verify trust in the agents and workloads, stable
- [Keylime](#): hardware root of trust, stable

Signing

- [PARSEC](#): access to hardware security, development
- [TUF](#): framework for signing, stable
- [Notary v2](#): signs artifacts on an OCI registry, design/prototype
- [Cosign](#): competing image signing project, early stable
- [Rekor](#): transparency logs, development

Distribution and Admission Control

- [OCI](#), stable with new development
- [OPA/Gatekeeper](#), stable


Related Projects / Groups

- [CNCF Security TAG](#) and Supply Chain WG
- [OpenSSF](#)
- [SLSA](#)


Reproducible Builds

Hardened Supply Chain vs Reproducible Builds

Normal Supply Chain




Reproducible Builds




Hardened Supply Chain vs Reproducible Builds

Normal Supply Chain



Reproducible Builds



Reproducible Builds

- reproducible-builds.org
- Nix
- Bazel
- Buildpacks

Wrapping Up

Wrapping Up

- This was not an exhaustive list
- Secure supply chains are a complex process
- Multiple tools need to be integrated
- Many of them are still being developed
- Help wanted

Thank You

github.com/sudo-bmitch/presentations



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